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R E S O L U T I O N S  W I T H O U T  R E S O L V E :
T U R N I N G  A W A Y  F R O M  U . N . S E C U R I T Y  
C O U N C I L  R E S O L U T I O N S  T O  A D D R E S S  
C O N F L I C T - R E L A T E D  S E X U A L  V I O L E N C E
mma . acfarlane*
In 2008, the United Nations first recognized rape as a war 
crime with the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1820. Since then, the fight against conflict-related sexual vio-
lence has become a frequent subject of Security Council Resolu-
tions. But what, if anything, has changed? Wartime sexual vio-
lence is still prevalent today and shows no signs of slowing down. 
This Note argues that Security Council Resolutions are not an ef-
fective method to prevent conflict-related sexual violence. The 
procedural weaknesses in passing Security Council Resolu-
tions and the structure of the Security Council itself may do more 
harm than good to the efforts to end wartime sexual vio-
lence. Instead, this Note finds a solution in an unlikely realm: 
using voluntary pollution prevention programs as a template to 
address wartime sexual violence. In examining the parallels be-
tween the two issues, this Note suggests a new framework for ad-
dressing wartime sexual violence, relying on three factors in par-
ticular: adequate and consistent funding to key organizations, 
regular and credible monitoring of vulnerable communities, and 
the credible threat of enforcement.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School (2021). My sincere thanks to the 
editors of the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law for their thoughtful suggestions and 
insights on this topic.
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Introduction
“The world must draw a red line on the impunity of abusing 
women in war.”—Dr. Denis Mukwege, Nobel Peace Prize 
Laureate 2018.1
Nadia Murad’s story shocked the public conscience.2 Ms. Murad is 
a Yazidi woman whose hometown is in Sinjar, a district in the moun-
1. “The World Must Draw a Red Line on the Impunity of Abusing Women in War,” Nobel 
Peace Prize 2018 Laureate—Dr. Denis Mukwege, NEW AFRICAN (Dec. 10, 2018), 
http://newafricanmagazine.com/17552/ [http://perma.cc/P7FB-Z8J8].
2. See Nobel Peace Prize Goes to U.N. Goodwill Ambassador and Congolese Doctor, High-
lighting Sexual Violence, U.N. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story
/2018/10/1022322 [http://perma.cc/FKE6-HBCB].
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tains of northern Iraq.3 In 2014, ISIS soldiers kidnapped Ms. Murad 
from her home.4 She was held as a sex slave for three months as she and 
several hundred other girls and young women were subjected to repeat-
ed beatings and rapes.5 Ms. Murad eventually escaped and made her 
way to a refugee camp near Mosul.6 She is now an activist for Yazidi 
women and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, frequently recognized along 
with gynecologist Denis Mukwege for their advocacy on behalf of vic-
tims of sexual violence.7 Ms. Murad’s work includes rebuilding com-
munities that have suffered through wartime violence; sustainably rede-
veloping her homeland in Iraq; working with local community groups 
to promote projects that focus on healthcare, water, and hygiene; and 
sponsoring education initiatives for women.8
The conflict-related sexual violence that Ms. Murad experienced 
has existed since at least the twentieth century, and almost certainly be-
fore this time despite a dearth of documentation.9 No geographic region 
has been immune.10 It frequently occurs during times of conflict as it is 
a brutal yet effective way to maintain control over a civilian popula-
tion.11 Its physical, emotional, and psychological implications are trau-
3. About Nadia Murad, NADIA’S INITIATIVE, https://nadiasinitiative.org/nadia-murad/
[http://perma.cc/3BA6-J45Q].




7. About Nadia Murad, supra note 3.
8. Our Work, NADIA’S INITIATIVE, https://www.nadiasinitiative.org/our-work [http://
perma.cc/RS3V-AZH3].
9. See Joanna Bourke, Rape as a Weapon of War, 383 LANCET e19, e19-20 (2014) (book 
review).
10. Examples of nations that have experienced the atrocity include France; the Rhine-
land; Spain; the former Soviet Union; Greece; and, more recently, within Colombia; 
Chechnya; India; Bangladesh; the Democratic Republic of Congo; the Central Afri-
can Republic; and South Sudan. Id; see also Central African Republic: Sexual Violence 
as a Weapon of War, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 5, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/05/central-african-republic-sexual-violence-
weapon-war [http://perma.cc/XJ78-TUZL]; Rebecca Ratcliffe, Rape is an Instrument 
of War in Central African Republic Conflict, Finds Study, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2017, 
8:03 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/oct/05/rape-
instrument-of-war-central-african-republic-conflict-study-sexual-slavery
[http://perma.cc/HGY8-BF7W]; Nick Cumming-Bruce, Mass Rape, a Weapon of 
War, Traumatizes South Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/africa/un-reports-systematic-rape-in-
south-sudan-conflict.html [http://perma.cc/CNC6-JS4P].
11. Anna Gopsill, Recognizing All Victims and Survivors of Sexual Violence in Wartime,
CMI-CHR MICHELSEN INST. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.cmi.no/news/2096-
sexual-violence-in-wartime [http://perma.cc/XE3T-FB5K].
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matic and long-lasting, and the shame survivors experience can often-
times prevent subsequent reports of the widespread sexual violence.12
The experienced trauma together with the lack of reporting is exactly 
what makes wartime sexual violence so effective.
In an effort to globally address wartime sexual violence, the United 
Nations (“U.N.”) first recognized rape as a war crime in 2008 with the 
passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820.13 Other 
resolutions soon followed. They ranged from responses to specific wars 
in which sexual violence was committed, like Resolution 2429 (adopted 
in 2018) that addressed sexual violence taking place in Sudan and South 
Sudan,14 to those with broader purposes, like Resolution 2331 (adopted 
in 2016) that addressed the nexus between sexual violence, terrorism, 
and transnational organized crime.15 These resolutions have been met 
with mixed responses from national governments, international lawyers, 
and human rights lobbyists due to their varied purposes and effects.
This Note argues that Security Council Resolutions are an ineffec-
tive mechanism to respond to conflict-related sexual violence as they do 
more damage than good. Instead, the U.N. should turn to alternative 
methods of action that have proved successful in other areas of interna-
tional law. This Note uses the paradigm of pollution prevention to more 
effectively address wartime sexual violence.
Section I provides a brief history of wartime sexual violence and de-
scribes the Security Council Resolution enactment process. Section II 
describes the procedural difficulties inherent in using Security Council 
Resolutions to end wartime sexual violence. It concludes that Security 
Council Resolutions are not only an ineffective method to end wartime 
sexual violence, but also frequently lead to damaging discourse that ul-
timately backtrack women’s rights on an international scale. Section III 
proposes an alternative to Security Council Resolutions, which more ef-
fectively addresses wartime sexual violence. The proposal adopts meth-
12. Id.
13. Lindsay L. Wright, Fails So Good: An Examination of the United Nations’ Ineffective 
Implementation of Resolution 1820 in Democratic Republic of Congo, 35 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 153 (2012). Security Council Resolutions are “formal ex-
pressions of the will or opinion” of the United Nations Security Council. Resolutions,
UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content
/resolutions-0 [http://perma.cc/C2CU-AKQJ]. For a more in-depth discussion on 
Security Council Resolutions and their formation, see discussion infra Section I.B.
14. S.C. Res. 2429, ¶ 35 (July 13, 2018).
15. S.C. Res. 2331, ¶ 8 (Dec. 20, 2016); see also Our Mandate, OFF. OF THE SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SEC’Y-GEN. ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT,
https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/our-work/our-mandate/
[http://perma.cc/84E3-B7JH].
2020] R E S O L U T I O N  W I T H O U T  R E S O L V E 439
ods used in voluntary pollution prevention programs to eliminate sexual 
violence as a weapon of war through U.N. organs. Adequate and con-
sistent funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of en-
forcement are each explored as tools that may supplant ineffective Secu-
rity Council Resolutions.
I. Wartime Sexual Violence and the United Nations 
Security Council
A. Wartime Sexual Violence
This Section will provide fundamental historical context for sexual 
violence during armed conflict and detail the relation between this 
atrocity and Security Council Resolutions. First, it is important to un-
derstand what this violence is. This Note interchangeably uses “wartime 
sexual violence,” “conflict-related sexual violence,”16 and “sexual vio-
lence during armed conflict.”17 It intentionally avoids the term “rape as 
a weapon of war”18 due to its narrower connotations.19 Wartime sexual 
violence is not limited to rape; it concerns violence on a much broader 
spectrum, including “sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnan-
cy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage,” and all oth-
er forms of sexual violence linked to a conflict.20 The term “conflict,” in 
turn, includes situations of “mass armed conflict or ‘lethal intergroup 
violence.’”21 A formal declaration of war is not necessary.22 Indeed, even 
if only one side is in a position to partake in systematic violence, this 
may still establish a conflict zone.23 For example, within the first two 
16. See, e.g., Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/conflict-related-sexual-violence [http://perma.cc
/JED7-P2C4] (defining “conflict-related sexual violence”).
17. E.g., Janie Leatherman, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: Complex Dynamics of Re-
Victimization, 12 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 53, 55 (2007) (using the term “sexual vio-
lence in armed conflict”).
18. See Maria Eriksson Baaz & Maria Stern, Curious Erasures: The Sexual in Wartime 
Sexual Violence, 20 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 295, 296 (2018).
19. See Elizabeth D. Heineman, Introduction to SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES:
FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2 (Elizabeth D. 
Heineman ed., 2013).
20. U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict Related Sexual Violence, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2019/280
(Mar. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Conflict Related Sexual Violence].
21. Heineman, supra note 19, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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weeks of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Hutu majority engaged in 
rampant sexual violence against the Tutsi minority.24 While there was 
no formal declaration of war, this constituted wartime sexual violence all 
the same.25
Two additional key facts undergird this Note’s discussion of con-
flict-related sexual violence. First, the perpetrators of sexual violence 
during armed conflict are not exclusively male, and those subjected to it 
are not exclusively female.26 Although targeting transcends gender, those 
most commonly subjected to wartime sexual violence are women.27 Sec-
ond, wartime sexual violence is inextricably linked to the basic human 
rights of women.28 Wartime sexual violence has been equated to acts of 
torture,29 genocide,30 and terrorism.31 Its psychological, physical, and so-
cial consequences can each prove deadly. Survivors describe a range of 
devastating mental health repercussions: Shame, sadness, anger, fear, 
anxiety, and depression persist after the violence, and these feelings may 
24. Jennifer Rosenberg, A Timeline of the Genocide in Rwanda, THOUGHT CO.
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/rwanda-genocide-timeline-1779930
[http://perma.cc/3QAC-QNTA].
25. See id.
26. Dara Kay Cohen, Amelia Hoover Green, & Elisabeth Jean Wood, Wartime Sexual 
Violence: Misconceptions, Implications, and Ways Forward, SPECIAL REPORT (U.S. Inst. 
of Peace, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2013, at 1, 2. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files
/resources/SR323.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TZ4-A3GR].
27. LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004 325 (Hum. Rts. Watch. ed., 2004),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B64A-
B9SE]. This takes into account the sexual violence against men and boys that often 
goes unreported. See Leatherman, supra note 17, at 54. While data on the levels of 
wartime sexual violence against LGBTQIA+ individuals, including transgender, non-
binary, and gender nonconforming individuals, is incomplete, the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention notes that this demographic experiences sexual violence dur-
ing peacetime at similar or higher rates than straight, cisgender individuals, in addi-
tion to higher rates of hate-motivated violence. Sexual Assault and the LGBTQ Com-
munity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-assault-and-
the-lgbt-community [http://perma.cc/4VVD-SQEV]. It seems possible—if not like-
ly—that these statistics would carry into a wartime setting.
28. See Miranda Alison, Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions 
of Masculinity, 33 REV. INT’L STUD. 75, 75 (2007).
29. Pieter Kooijmans, the Former Special Rapporteur on Torture, opined: “Since it was 
clear that rape or other forms of sexual assault against women in detention were a 
particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and right to physical integ-
rity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an act of torture.” U.N. 
ESCOR, 48th Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR.21 (Feb. 21, 
1992).
30. Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20, at ¶ 32.
31. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
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be further augmented by unwanted pregnancies.32 Women who survive 
wartime sexual violence are sometimes left with mutilated genitalia33 and 
infected with diseases that can become deadly.34 These traumas, along 
with living through the experience of sexual violence itself, can render 
survivors pariahs within their own communities.35 Worse, survivors may 
later be subjected to domestic violence or family-led honor killings in 
communities that view any sexual activity outside of marriage as shame-
ful or as bringing dishonor.36 Sexual violence during armed conflict is a 
uniquely devastating form of violence that has catastrophic effects on 
the mental and physical health of survivors.37
Sexual violence during times of conflict has been called “as old as 
warfare.”38 While this may be true, to assert that sexual violence is al-
ways present in wartime or during a conflict is to suggest a “natural”
pairing between the two phenomena.39 This proposition is in itself de-
structive. Not only does it conceal the diversity of conflict-related vio-
lent experiences,40 but it also downplays sexual violence as an inevitable 
consequence of conflict.41 Commentators have argued that viewing sex-
ual violence as a foregone conclusion during wartime leads to ignoring 
32. GLOB. JUST. CTR., THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION FOR GIRLS AND WOMEN RAPED IN 
ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2011), https://globaljusticecenter.net/documents/LegalBrief.
RightToAnAbortion.February2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JJH-UNLF].
33. Id. at 7.
34. Aryn Baker, War and Rape, TIME INT’L, Mar. 21, 2016, at 20, 22-24.
35. GLOB. JUST. CTR., supra note 32, at 5.
36. Id.; see also, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in 
Arab Societies, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 918 (2010) (“The physical attachment of the 
hymen to the body needs to be evidenced and publicized. Killing a woman because 
she fails to bleed on her wedding night is one possible scenario for an honor kill-
ing.”).
37. See generally Mahlet Atakilt Woldetsadik, Long-Term Effects of Wartime Sexual Vio-
lence on Women and Families (July 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Pardee Rand Gradu-
ate School) (on file with the Pardee Rand Graduate School Library); see also Vér-
onique Nahoum-Grappe, Sexual Violence in Wartime, 2 INFLEXIONS 183, 187 (2011)
(“The crime of rape is therefore not only a painful invasion of the body, possession 
and physical—followed by political—domination, but also a major factor in identity 
destruction, in cultures where women’s honour is defined by their rejection of unlaw-
ful sexual activity and thus, for example by their virginity up to the time of mar-
riage.”).
38. Heineman, supra note 19, at 5.
39. Nahoum-Grappe, supra note 37, at 184.
40. Id.
41. See Elisabeth Jean Wood & Julia Bleckner, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 3 IISS
ARMED CONFLICT SURV. 25, 25 (2017).
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sexual violence as an abuse of human rights.42 Instead, it is accepted as 
an “unfortunate but inevitable side effect of sending men to war.”43
The true reach of sexual violence during conflict is difficult to 
gauge. Historically, few measures have been taken to record sexual vio-
lence against women during armed conflict.44 Today, flawed methods of 
determining the number of victims result in estimates plagued by both 
over- and undercounting; as such, when data is produced, the range of 
estimated victims is wide.45 For example, estimates of the number of 
sexual violence victims during the 1994 Rwandan genocide range from 
250,000 to 500,000 individuals.46 Regardless of the lack of conclusive 
data, what is clear from these estimates is that sexual violence during 
times of conflict is far from behind us. The former United Nations Sec-
retary-General termed this type of violence a “present-day atrocity”47
and characterized its use as a common tactic of modern warfare.48
Responses to wartime sexual violence have varied on both national 
and international levels. The focus of this Note centers on international 
responses, but frequently, national non-governmental coalitions have 
effectively contributed in responding to wartime sexual violence. For ex-
ample, women-led civil society organizations have mobilized politically 
to protest the threat of conflict-related sexual violence in their coun-
tries.49 La Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres50 is a grassroots feminist move-
42. See id. at 32 (arguing that viewing sexual violence in war as not inevitable strengthens 
the grounds for holding perpetrators accountable).
43. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Regan E. Ralph, Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of 
Impunity, 14 SAIS REV. 81, 81 (1994).
44. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response, WOMEN2000, April 
1998, at 2, 3 (1998).https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7QZK-BG4B].
45. Tia Palermo & Amber Peterman, Undercounting, Overcounting and the Longevity of 
Flawed Estimates: Statistics on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 89 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 924, 924-25 (2011).
46. Id.
47. Deputy Secretary-General’s Opening Remarks at Press Briefing with Secretary-General’s
Special Representative Margot Wallstrom and Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy,
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (Feb. 9, 2010), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg
/press-encounter/2010-02-09/deputy-secretary-generals-opening-remarks-press-
briefing [http://perma.cc/6JWB-4Y74].
48. U.N.: Sexual Violence a ‘Tactic of War,’ HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2015,
10:13 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/un-sexual-violence-tactic-war
[https://perma.cc/65Q2-BPJS].
49. See Anne-Kathrin Kreft, Responding to Sexual Violence: Women’s Mobilization in War,
56 J. PEACE RSCH. 220 (2018).
50. RUTA PACÍFICA DE LAS MUJERES, COLOMBIAN WOMEN’S TRUTH AND MEMORY 
COMMISSION 1, https://www.rutapacifica.org.co/descargas/comisionverdad/Truthand
MemoryCommission.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6CU-T6TK].
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ment in Colombia that was instrumental in negotiating a solution to the 
country’s 1996 armed conflict between the government and guerrilla 
groups.51 The organization, still in existence today, describes itself as 
“feminist, pacifist, and anti-militarist,”52 and was formed in a response 
to the violence women faced in conflict zones.53 The mandate of La Ru-
ta Pacífica is to showcase the effects that war has on women’s bodies and 
to demand both accountability and a negotiated solution to conflict.54
The effectiveness of these national responses cannot be understated: Any 
international solution is necessarily undergirded by the support of na-
tional coalitions such as La Ruta Pacífica.
Governments have also worked to prioritize legislation to strength-
en protections against wartime sexual violence and to dedicate compre-
hensive services to survivors. For example, in March 2020, the Sudanese 
government signed a Framework of Cooperation with the United Na-
tions to address the sexual violence that has occurred for years within 
the Darfur region.55 Among other stipulations, the agreement commits 
both the Sudanese government and the United Nations to develop and 
support legislation to bolster protections against wartime sexual vio-
lence.56 The agreement also lays out commitments to provide wide-
ranging health services and support to survivors, and stipulates en-
hanced methods to investigate and prosecute perpetrators.57 Through
these responses, among other methods, the United Nations has played a 
large role in bringing wartime sexual violence to the fore of international 
conversations on human rights.58
51. Id.
52. Andrew Willis Garcés, Ruta Pacifica: Colombian Women Against Violence, UPSIDE 
DOWN WORLD (Feb. 4, 2009), http://upsidedownworld.org/archives/colombia/ruta-
pacifica-colombian-women-against-violence/ [https://perma.cc/C86U-6KUT].
53. RUTA PACÍFICA DE LAS MUJERES, supra note 50.
54. Garcés, supra note 52.
55. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Off. Special Rep. Sec’y-Gen. on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, The Government of Sudan and the United Nations Sign a Framework of 




57. Id.; see also Framework of Cooperation of the Republic of the Sudan and the United 




58. See, e.g., Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20.
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B. United Nations Security Council Resolutions
The U.N. has a number of mechanisms at its disposal to address 
the issue of wartime sexual violence and the organization has deployed 
these tools with varying levels of success. One such method is the Secu-
rity Council Resolution.
The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs 
of the United Nations and is tasked with maintaining international 
peace and security.59 To this end, the Security Council has the power to 
pass resolutions which serve as “formal expressions of the opinion or will 
of United Nations organs.”60 The topics of Security Council Resolutions 
range from the safety and security of peacekeepers;61 to commentary on 
human rights circumstances in a particular country;62 to topics applica-
ble to a range of geographic areas, like the threat of terrorist acts.63 In its 
capacity as a keeper of peace and security, the United Nations Security 
Council has attempted to address wartime sexual violence through reso-
lutions.
The Security Council is composed of fifteen members.64 Five 
members are permanent, collectively known as the “Permanent Five”—
China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
and ten are non-permanent,65 elected for two-year terms by the United 
Nations General Assembly.66 Resolutions are passed by an affirmative 
vote of nine of the fifteen Security Council members.67 All members of 
the “Permanent Five” have veto power under the U.N. Charter.68 Thus, 
59. U.N. Charter art. 39.
60. Resolutions, supra note 13.
61. See S.C. Res. 2518, 1 (Mar. 30, 2020). Peacekeepers are U.N. agents “called upon 
not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political pro-
cess, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote hu-
man rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.” What is Peacekeeping, UNITED 
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping 
[https://perma.cc/L5DV-CCEH].
62. See S.C. Res. 2510 (Feb. 12, 2020).
63. See S.C. Res. 2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
64. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
65. Id.
66. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 2. The ten non-permanent members are currently: Belgium, 
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, and Vietnam. Current Members, UNITED 
NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-
members [https://perma.cc/WJX9-BHFQ].
67. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 2.
68. See id. ¶ 3.
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if any member of the Permanent Five votes against a resolution, the res-
olution will fail.69
The Security Council derives its authority to adopt resolutions 
from the U.N. Charter. It may enact a resolution under one of two 
chapters of the Charter. Different international legal consequences flow 
from resolutions adopted under the respective Chapters. Chapter VII of 
the Charter allows the Security Council to deploy forces by land, sea, or 
air to enforce peace and security.70 Further, it permits U.N. Member 
States to take more aggressive measures to address resistance against 
peacekeeping operations when more protection-oriented measures have 
failed.71 These initial protection-oriented measures typically take place 
under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter which governs the pacific settle-
ments of disputes.72 Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are general-
ly considered to be legally enforceable, while those adopted under Chap-
ter VI are understood to be non-binding.73
This is not to say that non-binding U.N. resolutions passed under 
Chapter VI can never contribute meaningfully to international peace 
and security. But in terms of conflict-related sexual violence, the efficacy 
of these resolutions is a matter of debate.74 Ten years after the enactment 
of the first Security Council Resolution addressing wartime sexual vio-
lence,75 this weapon of war is still often used with impunity.76 That sex-
69. Note that only a veto (or vote against a resolution) forces any resolution to fail entire-
ly. Members of the Permanent Five may abstain from voting with no effect on the 
outcome of the resolution, providing that the resolution receives the requisite support 
from other members of the U.N. Security Council. SEC. COUNCIL REP., THE VETO
(2015), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org (search “The Veto”) [https://perma.cc
/X295-RYKE]. For more information on the process of abstaining from Security 
Council votes, see Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstentions from Voting 
and Absence from Meeting, 60 YALE L.J. 209 (1951).
70. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 45, 50.
71. See SEC. COUNCIL REP., SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII: MYTHS 
AND REALITIES (2008), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org (search “Security 
Council Action Under Chapter VII”) [https://perma.cc/6V3C-BGER].
72. See U.N. Charter arts. 33-38.
73. See id. at 7, 9; see also S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019); Sexual Violence Monitoring,
PEACEWOMEN, http://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/sexual-violence-
indicators-and-monitoring [https://perma.cc/8ZGB-ZA2Z].
74. See SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 71, at 9. See also Sophie Huvé, The Use of 
U.N. Sanctions to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, GEORGETOWN INST.
FOR WOMEN, PEACE & SEC. 23-26 (2018), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Use-of-UN-Sanctions-to-Address-Conflict-related-Sexual-
Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVB5-2XEX].
75. See S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008).
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ual violence during wartime continues unabated and is even increasing 
in an alarming number of regions throughout the world77 is but one in-
dicator that existing Security Council Resolutions have been and will 
continue to be an ineffective tool to address this issue.
II. The Deficiencies of Security Council Resolutions in 
Addressing Wartime Sexual Violence
Problems with addressing conflict-related sexual violence through 
Security Council Resolutions chiefly stem from the procedural aspects 
of passing those resolutions. Section II.A details how the consensus-
building process necessary to pass a resolution can cause a regression in 
Security Council precedent, which in turn causes a backsliding of wom-
en’s rights. Section II.B outlines how the Security Council voting struc-
ture creates undesirable incentives for powerful members to veto resolu-
tions that might be used to address human rights abuses within their 
own borders. Section II.C identifies how the Security Council’s limita-
tions necessarily position the protection of women from sexual violence 
as a means to an end. This creates a hierarchy that subverts women’s 
rights, making them secondary to international peace and security. Fi-
nally, Section II.D showcases how, in spite of over a decade’s worth of 
Security Council Resolutions addressing the subject, there is a dearth of 
normative and behavioral change surrounding sexual violence during 
conflict.
A. The Drawbacks of Consensus-Building
On April 29, 2019, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 2467 on Women, Peace and Security.78 It was lauded by the 
76. See Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War, DR. DENIS MUKWEGE FOUND.,
https://www.mukwegefoundation.org/the-problem/rape-as-a-weapon-of-war/
[https://perma.cc/HYC3-S9N3].
77. See id. Known areas of sexual violence currently include Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and 
Burma. Christian Caryl, Opinion, Rape Is Still Being Used as a Weapon of War Right 
Now. Today., WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/democracy-post/wp/2017/11/21/rape-is-still-being-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-right-
now-today/ [https://perma.cc/E3GL-3TBG].
78. Press Release, U.N. Off. Special Rep. Sec’y-Gen. on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019) Strengthens Justice and 
Accountability and Calls for a Survivor-Centered Approach in the Prevention and 
Response to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.un.org
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United Nations as strengthening justice and accountability and for its 
“survivor-centered approach in the prevention and response to conflict-
related sexual violence.”79 At first blush, the text of the Resolution is en-
couraging. The Resolution calls upon United Nations Member States to 
provide care to survivors of rape during situations of armed conflict 
without “any discrimination,” and draws attention to “groups that are 
particularly vulnerable or may be specifically targeted” in conflict and 
post-conflict situations.80 The Resolution also requests that the Secre-
tary-General report periodically on Member State compliance and steps 
taken to implement the Resolution.81 Finally, Article 35 of the Resolu-
tion encourages countries to adopt and regularly refresh fully funded na-
tional action plans to progress the U.N.’s Women, Peace and Security 
Agenda.82 This initiative stresses the importance of women’s equal par-
ticipation in post-conflict reconstruction and in the promotion of peace 
and security.83 It also encourages the incorporation of all gender per-
spectives in U.N. efforts to promote and maintain peace and security.84
Finally, Resolution 2467 includes a number of firsts. These include wel-
coming regular briefings by women from civil society groups on con-
flict-related sexual violence and addressing the unique hardships of 




perma.cc/RZQ2-S5W3] [hereinafter Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 
2467]; Overview of Resolution 2467: Women, Peace and Security, PERMANENT 
MISSION OF THE FED. REPUBLIC OF GER. TO UNITED NATIONS, https://new-york-
un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/-/2216570 [https://perma.cc/L5QR-UE6V].
79. Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467, supra note 78.
80. S.C. Res. 2467, ¶ 16 (Apr. 23, 2019); see also Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 2467, supra note 78.
81. See S.C. Res. 2467, ¶¶ 6, 8 (Apr. 2019).
82. Id. ¶ 35.
83. Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, OFF. OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER 
ON GENDER ISSUES & THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, https://www.un.org
/womenwatch/osagi/wps/ [https://perma.cc/FP79-DCQL].
84. Id.
85. A Security Council report explains:
For the first time, the Security Council addresses the situation of mothers 
of children born of sexual violence and their children in detail and spells 
out the challenges facing them, such as economic and social marginaliza-
tion, physical and psychological injury, statelessness, discrimination and 
lack of access to reparations. The resolution requests the Secretary-
General to provide a report to the Security Council on this topic until 
2021.
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These developments should not obscure the reality that the consen-
sus-building process diluted the Resolution and resulted in a watered-
down decree that varied widely from its original form.86 Certain aspects 
of Resolution 2467 are a regression. Notably absent from Resolution 
2467 is any mention of sexual and reproductive health services for sur-
vivors of sexual violence during armed conflict.87 This is significant be-
cause it is a marked backslide from previous Security Council Resolu-
tions which have recognized the sexual and reproductive rights of 
women for over twenty years.88 Further, the word “gender” is conspicu-
ously absent from the text of the resolution.89 This is meaningful be-
cause it signals that transgender individuals are excluded from the scope 
of the resolution.90 Moreover, it departs from past practice where the 
term was used liberally in resolutions addressing conflict-related sexual 
violence.91
Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467, supra note 78.
86. For example, a series of insights produced by the Security Council Report on evolv-
ing Security Council actions explains:
Three permanent members of the Council (China, Russia, and the US) 
expressed opposition to several aspects of the text during the negotiations, 
and at various stages of the process, all three threatened to use their veto. 
The original draft resolution was ambitious. Designed to focus on a “sur-
vivor-centered approach” to preventing and responding to sexual violence 
in conflict, it addressed several issues that were controversial for these 
permanent members. Among the contentious issues were whether to in-
clude language on the sexual and reproductive health of victims of sexual 
violence, whether to establish a formal mechanism (that is, a working 
group) on sexual violence in conflict, references to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), and recognition of LGBTI as a vulnerable group.
See In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, WHAT’S




88. U.S. Stance at U.N. a Backward Step on Women’s Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 25, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/25/us-stance-un-
backward-step-womens-rights [https://perma.cc/29DP-7WNM].
89. In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note 
86.
90. See Julian Borger, Trump Administration Wants to Remove ‘Gender’ From U.N. Hu-
man Rights Documents, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2018, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/24/trump-administration-gender-
transgender-united-nations [https://perma.cc/D4RW-JU4B].
91. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1820 art. 11 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 2331 Preamble, ¶¶ 8, 19 
(Dec. 20, 2016); S.C. Res. 2429 Preamble, ¶¶ 7, 11, 19, 27, 35, 39, 44, 56 (July 13, 
2018).
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Finally, because the Security Council implicitly adopted the Reso-
lution under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter,92 compliance with the 
Security Council’s recommendations is not mandated and no enforce-
ment actions can be taken.93 Although this does not mean U.N. mem-
bers may flout the resolution with impunity, holding states accountable 
is a difficult endeavor. Member states are well aware of this: Although 
the Council passed the Resolution with strong support—thirteen votes 
in favor and two abstentions from permanent members China and Rus-
sia—U.N. Member States such as China still flouted attempts to estab-
lish a formal mechanism implementing the Resolution,94 thereby frus-
trating its effectiveness.95
The negotiations leading to Resolution 2467 and its final outcome 
give insight into why Security Council Resolutions are manifestly defi-
cient in addressing and preventing conflict-related sexual violence. 
Three key issues remained on the table throughout much of the negotia-
tions involving Resolution 2467: the use of the term “gender” within 
the text of the Resolution, the desired implementation mechanism for 
the Resolution, and the inclusion of a reference to sexual reproductive 
92. See infra Section II.B.
93. However, as has been made known by the International Court of Justice, under Arti-
cle 25 members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 
25; CHRISTINE CHINKIN & MADELEINE REES, COMMENTARY ON SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTION: CONTINUED STATE OBLIGATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
ACTION ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT 2467 4 (2019), http://www.lse.ac.uk
/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2019/Final-WPS-Commentary-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JLW-9XWH]. Although U.N. Members have agreed to accept 
and abide by Security Council Resolutions, in practice, there is little way to enforce 
this under Chapter VI.
94. Note that working groups are a common mechanism used in Resolutions and widely 
thought to represent customary international law, thereby strengthening their im-
plementation. See, e.g., Working Group on Discrimination Against Women and Girls, 
U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues
/Women/WGWomen/Pages/WGWomenIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/C8KZ-
RRJG]; Open-Ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child to Provide a Communications Procedure, UNITED NATIONS HUM.
RTS. COUNCIL (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGCRC/Pages
/OpenEndedWorkingGroupIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/ME9R-D64Q]. Instead, 
Resolution 2467 calls upon “other relevant United Nations missions and United Na-
tions entities,” such as the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, to 
share information with the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committees and 
“strengthen their cooperation” regarding this exchange of information. S.C. Res. 
2467, supra note 73, ¶ 12.
95. In Hindsight: Negotiations on Res. 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note 86.
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rights and services.96 Actions by the United States, China, and Russia 
led to the elimination of text addressing each of these issues. As ex-
plained below, the discussions between permanent members and their 
veto powers are emblematic of the larger problem of using Security 
Council Resolutions to address and prevent sexual violence as a weapon 
of war.
First, the United States threatened to veto the resolution if it in-
cluded any mention of sexual and reproductive health services for survi-
vors of conflict-related sexual violence.97 The Trump administration ob-
jected to this language for fear of it being construed as in support of 
abortion.98 That members of the Security Council bowed to the United 
States’ objection is stunning when one considers the international 
community’s stated views on a woman’s right to abortion following 
rape: The Human Rights Committee’s position is that “countries must 
provide safe, legal and effective access to abortion . . . most notably 
where the pregnancy is the result of rape”;99 the Committee Against 
Torture notes that forced pregnancy in the context of sexual violence 
constitutes torture;100 and both the Committee on Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) and the Commission on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities state that legal abortion is a “prereq-
uisite for safeguarding . . . human rights to life, health, equality before 
the law and equal protection of the law, non-discrimination, infor-
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Nina Besser Doorley, Trump Administration Escalates War on Words at the 
U.N., INT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH COAL. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://iwhc.org/2019/04
/trump-administration-escalates-war-words-un/ [https://perma.cc/25KR-QH3N].
98. Doorley, supra note 97. Note also that some scholars have argued that this policy 
should be considered in tandem with Trump’s revival of the “Global Gag Rule,” a
policy introduced under the Reagan administration, which bans non-U.S. non-
governmental organizations from receiving U.S. funds if they give information and 
referrals for abortion, provide safe abortion, or call for improved abortion legislation. 
Zoe Gillard, In Pursuing a New Resolution on Sexual Violence Security Council Signifi-
cantly Undermines Women’s Reproductive Rights, LONDON SCH. OF ECON.: WOMEN,
PEACE, & SEC. F. (April 25, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/04/25/in-
pursuing-a-new-resolution-on-sexual-violence-security-council-significantly-
undermines-womens-reproductive-rights/ [https://perma.cc/WZ9Y-XWEV]; What is 
the Global Gag Rule?, SHE DECIDES, https://www.shedecides.com/what-is-the-global-
gag-rule/ [https://perma.cc/AS82-V7HS].
99. Stop Regression on Sexual and Reproductive Rights of Women and Girls, UN Experts 
Urge, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents
/Reproductive_Rights_Violations_As_Torture.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM3S-48DA].
100. See Reproductive Rights Violations as Torture or Ill-Treatment, CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WG/AmicusBrazil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH4G-QF5C]
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mation, privacy, bodily integrity and freedom from torture and ill 
treatment.”101
Despite the consensus in the international community that abor-
tion is a vital human right, the United States’ opposition was effective. 
The language in support of sexual and reproductive services for survivors 
was eliminated.102 This illustrates one of the key weaknesses in using Se-
curity Council Resolutions to address human rights issues in general, 
and conflict-related sexual violence in particular: Thanks to the perma-
nent members’ veto power, even one regressive state administration can 
erase years of global progress on the development of human rights 
norms through their insistence on the inclusion or omission of choice 
terms within a resolution’s text.
Two other countries’ objections following the resolution’s passage 
also exemplify this devastating power dynamic. After Resolution 2467
passed, China and Russia objected to the creation of a working group 
on sexual violence in conflict (in essence, an accountability mechanism) 
by way of feeble explanations denouncing an overload of bureaucracy 
and shortage of “extensive discussions.”103 This pretext was to be ex-
pected: Both countries frequently vote against or abstain from Security 
Council Resolutions affirming human rights.104
Finally, the Security Council eliminated the word “gender” due to 
an enduring campaign by the Trump administration to remove the term 
101. Ref: Denial of Abortion Services and the Prohibition of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
23503&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/2MAU-WGQR].
102. Doorley, supra note 97.
103. A U.N. General Assembly report explains:
China and Russia in particular made clear their reluctance to see a work-
ing group at present, with China saying that “it is important to have ex-
tensive discussions well in advance” before creating “special mecha-
nisms,” and Russia declaring that it was concerned “about the efforts to 
increase the number of bureaucratic United Nations bodies in order to 
create the appearance of robust activity.
In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note 
86.
104. See, e.g., Sophie Richardson, Is China Winning Its Fight Against Rights at the U.N.?,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 12, 2018, 9:41 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12
/12/china-winning-its-fight-against-rights-un [https://perma.cc/F8UP-HX37];
Sherine Tadros, New Low for the U.N. Security Council as Russia Takes Syrian Human 
Rights off the Table, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en
/latest/news/2018/03/a-new-low-for-the-un-security-council-as-russia-takes-syrian-
human-rights-off-the-table/ [https://perma.cc/GAK2-E2XS].
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from all U.N. human rights documents.105 Commentators have de-
scribed this as an “ongoing strategy to undermine the recognized human 
rights of transgender individuals.”106 This is consistent with past actions 
by the Trump administration to ensure that transgender persons are not 
accorded the same protections as cisgender women and girls. For exam-
ple, in a previous U.N. draft document promoting gender equality, the 
U.S. administration under Trump recommended that the section be 
clarified to refer to only women and girls.107 The transphobic actions of 
the Trump administration demonstrate the power dynamics of the 
Permanent Five in action. Put simply, it only takes one backwards ad-
ministration to implement unacceptable changes within the text of a Se-
curity Council Resolution.
Despite Resolution 2467’s deficiencies, Member States such as 
France saw it as a step in the right direction.108 This is unsurprising 
when one considers the deference accorded to Security Council Resolu-
tions on the international stage. There is a dominant narrative propped 
up by the media109 and some members of the international communi-
ty110 that Security Council Resolutions are both effective and powerful. 
Throwing the weight of at least three of the permanent members behind 
the text of any Security Council Resolution related to conflict-related 
sexual violence serves not only to highlight the issue to an international 
audience, but can even elicit united action from U.N. Member States 
and U.N. committees to support the Resolution’s mandate.
When evaluated on the strength of their signaling function, howev-
er, the power of Security Council Resolutions may also be their greatest 
weakness. Security Council Resolutions either seek to “confirm [the 
Council’s] support for the validity and enforcement of the relevant in-
105. Borger, supra note 90.
106. Id.
107. Colum Lynch & Robbie Gramer, At the U.N., America Turns Back the Clock on 
Women’s Rights, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 14, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03
/14/at-united-nations-women-rights-gender-health-trump-diplomacy/
[https://perma.cc/2F2A-GAA6].
108. Resolution 2467: The Text Is Not the End of Our Journey, PERMANENT MISSION OF 
FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN N.Y. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://onu.deleg
france.org/Resolution-2467-the-text-is-not-the-end-of-our-journey [https://perma.cc
/37MH-GWR7].
109. See, e.g., Matthew Hauenstein & Madhav Joshi, U.N. Resolutions Might Seem Like 
Cheap Talk. But They Might Actually Work., WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/22/un-resolutions-may-seem-
like-cheap-talk-they-might-actually-work/ [https://perma.cc/36VR-HJKB].
110. See, e.g., ALEXANDER THOMPSON, CHANNELS OF POWER: THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL AND U.S. STATECRAFT IN IRAQ 204-10 (2010).
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ternational norms and instruments,” or “impact, qualify or modify the 
existing legal position under international law.”111 That is to say, omis-
sions speak just as powerfully as affirmative statements. With the Securi-
ty Council’s deliberate elimination of text supporting access to repro-
ductive health services, Resolution 2467 backslid Security Council prec-
precedent by at least ten years. Earlier resolutions in 2009 and 2013 
both recognized the need for and promoted access to reproductive 
health services for victims of sexual violence during wartime.112 The 
United States’ well-publicized rejection of terms supporting access to 
these services modifies the U.N.’s previous position that these services 
are vital, taking a step back rather than confirming their value.113 Ger-
many, the drafter of Resolution 2467, was forced to accede to U.S. de-
mands or risk foregoing the resolution entirely.114 And herein lies the 
difficulty: Is the greater risk to deny the passage of any Security Council 
Resolution, or to pass one that implicitly regresses the Security Coun-
cil’s stance on women’s rights?
B. Undesirable Incentives
The voting structure of the Permanent Five is the second reason 
that Security Council Resolutions cannot sufficiently address wartime 
sexual violence. Even if the omissions discussed above insisted upon by 
the United States are not viewed as significant, the divided votes from 
the Security Council’s permanent members should be. When 40% of 
the permanent members decline to support a resolution condemning 
sexual violence in conflict, claims of the Resolution’s “landmark” status 
and its characterization as a “powerful new instrument” in the United 
Nations’ arsenal for addressing wartime sexual violence become far less 
convincing.115
111. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Acts of the Security Council: Standards of Review, 11 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 143, 145 (2007).
112. See KERRY F. CRAWFORD, WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE: FROM SILENCE TO 
CONDEMNATION OF A WEAPON OF WAR 113-114 (2017).
113. S.C. Res. 1889 ¶ 10 (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C. Res. 2106 ¶ 19 (June 24, 2013); see also 
Resolution 2467: The Text Is Not the End of Our Journey, supra note 108.
114. Vanessa Jackson, What Does April’s Security Council Resolution on Sexual Violence in 




115. See Landmark U.N. Sec. Council Res. 2467, supra note 78.
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Security Council Resolutions can also be a dangerous tool when 
used to negotiate texts on human rights, and particularly the rights of 
women. China and Russia, two of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, have left unaddressed grave abuses of women within 
their respective states116 and are thereby incentivized to withhold sup-
port for resolutions pertaining to human rights. Similarly, these states 
are more likely to push back against effective mechanisms such as work-
ing groups, which could conceivably be used to support human rights 
within their own nations’ borders.117
C. The Protection of Women as a Means to an End
The third problem with using Security Council Resolutions as a 
mechanism to respond to sexual violence as a weapon of war stems from 
the mandate of the Security Council itself. The very framework of the 
Security Council prevents its members from addressing wartime sexual 
violence in a way that fully recognizes women’s rights as human rights. 
The Security Council’s mandate only allows the Council to create bind-
ing resolutions—those created under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter—in order to protect international peace and security.118 This means 
that resolutions must position the prevention of sexual violence against 
women as a means to that end, rather than a goal in and of itself119: Pro-
116. See China: Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2018), https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet [https://perma.cc/3WME-356G]; 
Yulia Gorbunoa, The Chilling Inaction on Domestic Violence in Russia is Endangering 
Women’s Lives, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 29, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2019/07/29/chilling-inaction-domestic-violence-russia-endangering-womens-
lives [https://perma.cc/CUP4-T9QC].
117. See Alexandra Ma, China is Reportedly Sending Men to Sleep in the Same Beds as Ui-
ghur Muslim Women While Their Husbands Are in Prison Camps, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 
4, 2019, 7:06 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/china-uighur-monitor-home-
shared-bed-report-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/NBC5-EP3E]; Elizabeth M. Lynch, 
China’s Attacks on Uighur Women Are Crimes Against Humanity, WASH. POST (Oct. 
21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/21/chinas-attacks-
uighur-women-are-crimes-against-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/E3R6-GX5A ]; Yuli-
ana Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me”: Weak State Response 
to Domestic Violence in Russia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/25/i-could-kill-you-and-no-one-would-stop-
me/weak-state-response-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/7BQT-YZZ9]; Russia: 
Unaddressed Domestic Violence Puts Women at Risk, HUM. RTS WATCH (Oct. 25 
2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/25/russia-unaddressed-
domestic-violence-puts-women-risk [https://perma.cc/JZ3A-BD2Q].
118. U.N. Charter, art. 23.
119. For example, Resolution 1820 explains:
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tecting women is within the purview of the Security Council only inso-
far as women are a peacebuilding resource.120 Sexual violence during 
wartime must be prevented because it “negatively affects women’s role 
as agents of peace.”121 It is the structure of the U.N. Charter itself that 
promotes this harmful discourse. To create an effective, binding, and 
enforceable resolution addressing the prevention of wartime sexual vio-
lence, the issue must be framed as a mere stop on the road toward the 
end result of peace and stability within nations.
Of course, the skeptic will be quick to note that the Security 
Council is not solely limited to the binding resolutions of Chapter VII, 
and can therefore take certain actions without needing to meet Chapter 
VII’s restrictive demands. Resolutions brought forth under Chapter VI 
of the U.N. Charter are non-binding, but unlike Chapter VII, the man-
date to act only for purposes of “international peace and security” does 
not exist.122
While this may make Chapter VI resolutions easier to pass, two key 
issues remain with these resolutions. First, they are only binding on 
states that consent to their application.123 If the country upon which the 
U.N. wishes to impose the resolution is itself a perpetrator of wartime 
sexual violence,124 enforcement becomes exceedingly difficult, as it is un-
likely that even a non-binding resolution will earn the support of the of-
fending country. Second, the legality of non-binding Security Council 
The Security Council . . . [is d]eeply concerned also about the persistent 
obstacles and challenges to women’s participation and full involvement in 
the prevention and resolution of conflicts as a result of violence, intimi-
dation and discrimination, which erode women’s capacity and legitimacy 
to participate in post-conflict public life, and acknowledging the negative 
impact this has on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including 
post-conflict peacebuilding.
S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 11.
120. Id.
121. Maria Jansson & Maud Edwards, The Politics of Gender in the U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions on Women, Peace & Security, 18 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL’Y 591, 598 (2016).
122. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Hum. Rts., & Oversight of the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affs., 110th Cong. 29 (2008) (prepared statement of Michael J.
Matheson, Visiting Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University 
Law School).
123. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 49 (1998).
124. For example, wartime rape by government forces occurred during the conflict in Dar-
fur to which the Security Council responded with Resolution 1769. S.C. Res. 1769 
(July 31, 2007); HUM. RTS. WATCH, FIVE YEARS ON: NO JUSTICE FOR SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN DARFUR 10-24 (2008), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/darfur0408
/darfur0408webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9XA-97HZ].
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Resolutions is frequently challenged on jurisdictional grounds.125 And 
even those resolutions stipulating efforts to end sexual violence against 
women that do go unchallenged have historically been ineffective.126 In 
sum, the need for consensus, nations’ undesirable and conflicting incen-
tives, and viewing the protection of women as a means to an end are 
near-insurmountable obstacles that render Security Council Resolutions 
an ineffective transnational mechanism to prevent wartime sexual vio-
lence.
D. Dearth of Lasting Normative and Behavioral Change
In the decade since Security Council Resolutions have begun to 
address the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, behavioral 
norms surrounding the use of this type of violence in war have not un-
dergone any significant changes. Resolution 1888 (2009) was the first to 
call for any obligation or implementation mechanism to prevent sexual 
violence as a weapon of war.127 Since then, Resolution 1960 (2010) 
went further by calling for annual reports identifying perpetrators credi-
bly suspected of committing sexual violence to hold them accounta-
ble.128 Three years later, Resolution 2106 (2013) acknowledged that 
men and transgender individuals could be targets and victims of con-
flict-related sexual violence, overturning the assumption that only wom-
en are affected by these atrocities.129 In spite of this progression in Secu-
125. As Malihe Behtar and Hassan Savari explain:
The text and spirit of the charter does not recognize the Security Council 
as an authority with infinite jurisdiction. Granting permission to the Se-
curity Council of States to make binding decisions doesn’t mean that the 
Security Council can go beyond its jurisdiction directly or indirectly. In
this regard legality of Security Council resolutions . . . have been chal-
lenged. These resolutions [are] contested by one or some States. These 
challenges [raise] judicial review of the Security Council decisions.
Malihe Behfar & Hassan Savari, Evaluation of UN Security Council Resolutions by 
States, 10 J. POL’Y & L. 204 (2017).
126. Wright, supra note 13, at 101 (“The United Nations deferred formal recognition of 
rape as a war crime until 2008, when it passed S.C. Res. 1820 (Resolution 1820). Ef-
forts to end sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) failed 
despite a detailed U.N. strategy to end atrocities.”); CRAWFORD, supra note 112
(“Resolution 1960 recognizes the all-too-frequent gap between Security Council reso-
lutions and actual commitments by the U.N. and its Member States, and it demon-
strates frustration with combatants’ continued use and tolerance of sexual violence.”).
127. CRAWFORD, supra note 112 at 113.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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rity Council discourse, wartime sexual violence is still considered ac-
ceptable in many parts of the world, and perpetrators are neither con-
sistently nor effectively held accountable.130
III. A New Solution to Address Wartime Sexual Violence
Since U.N. Security Resolutions have failed and will continue to 
fail to effectively stem wartime sexual misconduct, U.N. Member States 
must turn to alternative mechanisms for addressing and preventing sex-
ual violence during armed conflict. Inspiration may be found in an un-
likely setting. The international practices used to create voluntary pollu-
tion prevention programs provide an unorthodox yet effective template 
to address wartime sexual violence.131 These international practices re-
veal parallels between the two issues and provide a new framework for 
addressing wartime sexual violence—one that does not rely on ineffec-
tive Security Council Resolutions.
Section III.A details the common themes of the global fight against 
pollution and the prevention of wartime sexual violence. This analysis 
underscores why U.N. Member States should turn to the Voluntary 
Pollution Prevention Framework to address sexual violence as a weapon 
of war. Section III.B discusses the application of the Voluntary Pollu-
tion Prevention Framework to wartime sexual violence and identifies 
three crucial factors to the success of international cooperation in this 
realm: Adequate and consistent funding, regular and credible monitor-
ing, and the threat of enforcement.
A. Common Themes Between the Fight Against Pollution and the 
Prevention of Wartime Sexual Violence
The fight against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war 
shares three key similarities with the global fight against pollution. First, 
in each case, there is a dearth of international action despite consensus 
that a problem exists. Second, when initiatives are undertaken, follow-
through and execution are exceedingly rare. Finally, solving both issues 
130. Id.
131. See generally Donald G. Chittock & Kenneth F.D. Hughey, A Review of International 
Practice in the Design of Voluntary Pollution Prevention Programs, 19 J. CLEANER 
PROD. 542 (2010) (examining the features of successful voluntary pollution preven-
tion programs undertaken by Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States).
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requires cooperation on a global level. Examining the solutions to these 
problems in the pollution context may prove useful in tackling the pre-
vention of sexual violence during conflict.
i. Consensus
The primary similarity stems from the fact that despite widespread 
consensus among industry experts on the environmental and economic 
effects of pollution,132 international consensus on plans for action re-
mains lacking. Within the past four years alone, the United States with-
drew from the landmark Paris Climate Accord;133 Brazil’s president 
committed to the destruction of the Amazon by way of defending de-
forestation as “cultural”;134 and China refused to make any promises to 
take stronger climate action at the 2019 U.N. Climate Action Summit, 
despite excoriation from an official at the World Resources Institute and 
from other climate change advocates and diplomats.135
132. See Dana Nuccitelli, 95% Consensus of Expert Economists: Cut Carbon Pollution,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment
/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/jan/04/consensus-of-economists-cut-carbon-
pollution [http://perma.cc/DU2U-LWKP]; AM. LUNG ASS’N, STATE OF THE AIR 
2019 4 (2019), https://www.lung.org/assets/documents/healthy-air/state-of-the-air
/sota-2019-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6W3-WZQJ].
133. See Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement, (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-
withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/Y8TZ-A2DH]. Critics of the 
United States’ withdrawal note that this may have a devastating effect on the agree-
ment as a whole. Concerns abound that other nations will follow in the United 
States’ steps to leave; that this is not within the world’s best interests, as we are on the 
brink of a global climate catastrophe; and that the Paris Agreement was the “most re-
alistic approach for all of the nations of the world to positively address climate 
change.” Fran Ulmer & Carlos Curbelo, Commentary: U.S. Should Not Withdraw 
from Paris Climate Accord, CORDOVA TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.the
cordovatimes.com/2019/12/16/commentary-u-s-should-not-withdraw-from-paris-
climate-accord/ [http://perma.cc/VYW9-B8L4].
134. Marina Lopes, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Calls Amazon Deforestation ‘Cultural,’ Says ‘It Will 




135. Among other issues, environmental advocates wanted China to make commitments 
to move away from fossil fuels; to show initiative and a commitment to taking cli-
mate change seriously; and to meet global expectations for environmental leadership 
that belie its position as a major world economy. See Somini Sengupta & Lisa Fried-
man, At U.N. Climate Summit, Few Commitments and U.S. Silence, N.Y. TIMES
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Consider a simplified explanation of incentives that drive environ-
mental policies. The United States’ stated reason for withdrawing from 
the Paris Agreement was because it was “unfair” to the United States 
compared to the Agreement’s treatment of China and India.136 The 
United States further protested that complying with the Agreement de-
parted from the administration’s “America First” policy.137 Brazil’s reluc-
tance to act on environmental conservation efforts stemmed from Presi-
dent Jair Bolsonaro’s position that environmental regulations must be 
relaxed to encourage economic growth.138 China refused to take a 
stronger stance on climate change based on resource concerns: A past 
green initiative created a heightened demand for certain fuels, which at 
the time produced a shortage of the resource and left millions without 
heat.139
As with the prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war, com-
peting motivations in the realm of voluntary pollution prevention have 
created a tradition in which powerful nations fall short of commitments 
to robust transnational action plans.140 Under President Trump, the 
United States refused to advocate for services that might be interpreted 
as endorsing abortion within Security Council Resolution 2467 for fear 
of betraying the Republican Party’s position of opposing the procedure 
at all costs.141 China is also unwilling to sign onto resolutions that en-
dorse human rights for fear of the implications that endorsing such reso-
lutions might have on China itself.142 These competing motivations pre-
vent full, effective commitments from both countries to address wartime 
sexual violence.
(Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/climate/climate-summit-
global-warming.html [http://perma.cc/DV23-P8ZK].
136. Hai-Bin Zhang, Han-Cheng Dai, Hua-Xia Lai, & Wen-Tao Wang, U.S. Withdrawal 
from the Paris agreement: Reasons, Impact and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES CLIMATE 
CHANGE RSCH. 220, 221 (2017).
137. Id.
138. Mariana Simões, Brazil’s Bolsonaro on the Environment, in His Own Words, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/americas
/bolsonaro-brazil-environment.html [https://perma.cc/ZV4N-6WNG].
139. Yanzhong Huang, Opinion, Why China’s Good Environmental Policies Have Gone 
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/opinion
/china-environmental-policies-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/ER4Q-F5VD].
140. See, e.g., Brittany Gibson, The Industrialized World is Failing to Meet Paris Agreement 
Goals, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 1, 2019), https://prospect.org/world/climate-
crisis-industrialized-world-failing-to-meet-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/X7B9-
8YLQ].
141. See supra Section II.A.
142. See Richardson, supra note 104.
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ii. Follow-Through
The second similarity between these two global issues is a general 
failure to execute, even when commitments are made on the interna-
tional level. Domestic implementation of any plan to cut down on pol-
lution requires extensive public infrastructure to ensure success.143 The 
commitment to reduce pollution is more than a high-level pact. It re-
quires an in-the-weeds monitoring system of both small and large indus-
try players alike, a system that must be comprehensive and thorough.144
Likewise, the prevention of wartime sexual violence extends beyond 
sweeping resolutions that fail to create a world in which wartime sexual 
violence ceases to exist. Barring a stark international cultural shift in 
which every woman is recognized as having full human rights and allot-
ted a position of respect in each society—a goal to work towards, cer-
tainly, but that would be naïve to expect in the near future—the com-
mitment takes cooperation and work. There is an ongoing obligation to 
address the problem before it arises,145 to deploy defensive mechanisms 
during the conflict itself,146 and to aid survivors afterward through the
provision of sexual reproductive services and mental and physical thera-
py.147 The prevention of wartime sexual violence and voluntary pollu-
tion prevention programs have meaningful, core similarities. By study-
ing these programs, the international community may be better able to 
implement initiatives that will succeed in the prevention of wartime 
sexual violence.
iii. International Buy-In
A final similarity between the two issues pertains to how the global 
community can reach a permanent solution. Solving both issues requires 
a reliance on cooperation at an international level. Voluntary environ-
mental approaches oftentimes include collaboration between individual 
businesses, industry associations, and regulatory agencies or central gov-
143. See Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bu-
reaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 365 (2013).
144. See Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 548.
145. See infra Section III.B.
146. See infra Section III.B.
147. Countries frequently fall short on the implementation of these practices. See U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,
¶¶ 19-22, U.N. Doc S/2018/250 (Mar. 23, 2018).
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ernments.148 This cooperation among a panoply of national actors paral-
lels the range of players that the U.N. must bring together in a country 
to combat sexual violence as a weapon of war.149
B. The Application of the Voluntary Pollution Prevention Framework to 
Addressing Wartime Sexual Violence
Environmental law has identified several key features of successful 
voluntary pollution prevention programs that may be applicable to the 
prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war. In 2010, environmen-
tal law Professors Donald Chittock and Kenneth Hughey conducted a 
study surveying voluntary approaches to industry-wide pollution pre-
vention programs in Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.150 The Chittock research identified key features 
of successful programs, at least three of which are applicable to the pre-
vention of sexual violence as a weapon of war: Adequate and consistent 
funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforce-
ment. As the study notes, and as an apt precaution when weighing strat-
egies to prevent wartime sexual violence, no single mechanism is likely 
to work in all circumstances.151 These three approaches are intended to 
serve as preferred alternatives to Security Council Resolutions. Unlike 
Security Council Resolutions that risk backsliding international pro-
gress, the three recommended mechanisms have the benefit of being 
more practically effective while pushing forward the conversation sur-
rounding women’s rights.
The following proposal will elaborate on how each of the three fac-
tors identified in Chittock’s study can prove useful in the context of ad-
dressing wartime sexual violence. The piecemeal nature of this solution 
might be unattractive to some. This tripartite solution, however, has the 
benefit of being realistic. Neither a unilateral change to the approach 
nor the creation of a new multilateral framework would be an effective 
answer to how the international community combats conflict-related 
sexual violence. Although this proposal may be dissimilar to current ap-
proaches, it has the advantage of building upon pre-existing structures 
whenever possible and incorporating mechanisms readily accepted by 
148. Chittock, supra note 131, at 542.
149. See U.N. ACTION AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT, STOP RAPE NOW,
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/wps/StopRapeNow_Brochure.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F592-23JE].
150. See Chittock, supra note 131, at 542.
151. Id. at 543.
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the international community. In sum, a series of small, realistic fixes to 
the current system is preferable over a theoretically elegant yet practica-
bly unworkable solution.
i. Adequate and Consistent Funding
The first element of the new framework is adequate and consistent 
funding for programs that combat conflict-related sexual violence. In 
the pollution prevention context, the most successful pollution preven-
tion programs in the Chittock study had the benefit of consistent fund-
ing.152 Other scholars have highlighted this as the “single, most im-
portant element” in ensuring the success of the programs.153 The 
Chittock research found that reliable financing helped anti-pollution ef-
forts in two ways. First, the researchers found that adequate and con-
sistent funding worked to solidify pollution prevention’s place as one of 
the “mainstream goals” in national environmental management pro-
grams.154 Second, the funding worked as a positive incentive to bring 
key industry players into the fold of the voluntary programs.155 The con-
sistent stream of capital helped to persuade the actors in question that 
longevity of the program was assured.156
One key criticism of the Chittock research should be addressed up 
front. Commentators have noted that the five countries within the Chit-
tock study were each wealthy, developed nations.157 One may therefore 
question whether the study’s outcomes would be the same in less afflu-
ent countries. To this point, even if initiatives such as adequate and con-
sistent funding would not have produced a significant positive effect on 
the lifespan of developing countries’ pollution prevention programs, this 
does not diminish the study’s use as a template for the prevention of 
conflict-related sexual violence. It would be naïve to assume there is a 
152. Id. at 542.
153. Michael Peters & R. Kerry Turner, SME Environmental Attitudes and Participation in 
Local-Scale Voluntary Initiatives: Some Practical Applications, 47 J. ENV’T PLAN. &
MGMT. 449, 457 (2004) (noting that a second key part of this “element” was the 
“co-ordination of certain key players who would enable appropriate contacts to be 
made and would be able to attract the necessary funding”).
154. Chittock, supra note 131, at 545.
155. Chittock and Hughey note that a “collaborative relationship with industry” players is 
one of the key features of a successful voluntary pollution prevention program. See id.
at 542.
156. Id. at 547, 550.
157. The countries were Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Id. at 542.
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“one size fits all” method that would work for each country, region, or 
city in which violence is occurring. But to write off adequate and con-
sistent funding as a failure because certain research has yet to be con-
ducted would be a mistake.
Based on the findings of the Chittock study, this Note argues that 
adequate and consistent funding should also be applied in efforts to pre-
vent sexual violence as a weapon of war. States such as France and Ger-
many have the political will and resources to spend on this cause.158 As 
such, they need not waste diplomatic efforts on the negotiations of a 
“watered-down” Security Council Resolution.159 Instead, these countries 
can and should redirect their energies toward securing voluntary funds 
for U.N. offices with the bandwidth to address this issue.
Voluntary funds are one way for states to exert soft power or in-
formal governance over international organizations (IOs) and their sub-
sidiaries.160 IOs are institutional actors like the United Nations whose 
membership is composed of at least three nation states.161 There are two 
main ways that IOs are funded by their members. The first type of IO 
funding scheme is a restricted voluntary system of funding. In this in-
stance, state donors contribute funds earmarked for specific uses to the 
IO.162 This allows members of an IO not only to determine the size of 
their monetary contribution to the organization, but also to earmark 
how their donations are used.163 In other words, it creates a system of 
governance in which nations assign their funds to projects of their 
choosing.164 To illustrate the popularity of this mechanism, approxi-
mately 80% of the World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) voluntary 
funds are restricted for specific uses by their donors, as are 100% of the 
158. See Resolution 2467: The Text is Not the End of Our Journey, supra note 108 (detailing 
France’s disappointment in the U.S. position and reaffirming their commitment to 
sexual health services); Amy Gunia, U.S. Pressures U.N. into Removing Language from 
a Resolution on Sexual Violence, TIME (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:34 AM), https://time.com
/5577089/un-resolution-sexual-violence-weakened-language/ [http://perma.cc
/FHR9-NQYC]; see also Florence Schulz, U.N. Adopts Watered-Down Resolution 
Against Rape as Weapon of War, EURACTIV (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/un-adopts-watered-
down-resolution-against-rape-as-weapon-of-war/ [http://perma.cc/N54R-MGU6].
159. See Schulz, supra note 158.
160. See Erin R. Graham, Money and Multilateralism: How Funding Rules Constitute IO 
Governance, 7 INT’L THEORY 162, 163 (2015).
161. See Karen Mingst, International Organization, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-organization [http://perma.cc
/2FZB-ZFKF].
162. See Graham, supra note 160, at 173-74.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 174.
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voluntary contributions donated to the United Nations Economic So-
cial Council (“UNESCO”).165 Thus, donors have the power to shape the 
agendas of IOs through their contributions.
Restricted voluntary funding schemes stand in contrast to unre-
stricted voluntary funding methods. In the latter scenario, donors do 
not earmark their monetary donations, providing the IO with more 
freedom to implement its various goals.166 In the context of preventing 
and addressing wartime sexual violence, the use of a restricted voluntary 
funding scheme for donations to IOs is preferable to one that uses unre-
stricted voluntary funding, to ensure that this issue is the priority of 
IOs.
The restricted voluntary funding scheme also has two distinct ad-
vantages over the use of Security Council Resolutions. First, countries 
that wish to bypass the aforementioned political holdups of Security 
Council Resolutions may instead publicly earmark their donor funds to 
U.N. offices. This can signal the attention of the country in question to 
conflict-related sexual violence and encourage other Member States to 
do the same in turn.
One existing office to which nations may direct their funds is the 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict (“SRSG-SVC”).167 The role of the SRSG-SVC is to 
provide coherent and strategic leadership; to work effectively with exist-
ing U.N. coordination mechanisms; and to engage in advocacy efforts 
with governments, parties to armed conflict, and civil society.168 Anoth-
er potential target of Member States’ voluntary funding contribution is 
Women’s Protection Advisers (“WPAs”), which takes on the role of ad-
vising during peacekeeping and special political missions in the midst of 
conflict-related sexual violence.169 By directing restricted voluntary funds 
to these offices, U.N. Member States could send a stronger message 
than any non-binding Security Council Resolution brought forth by di-
vided members and lacking an implementation plan ever could. Instead 
of issuing resolutions “calling upon” other countries to help the cause, 
states can and should lead by example. This message would become 
even more powerful should states band together in donative coalitions 
for this common cause.
165. See id. at 173.
166. Id. at 173.
167. See generally S.C. Res. 2331, supra note 15.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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Second, adequate and consistent funding from the U.N. into offic-
es such as the SRSG-SVC will help states fulfill the due diligence aspect 
of their positive obligations. These include educating employees of the 
judicial system and ensuring credible, thorough criminal investigations 
when crimes do occur.170 This will work to deter and ultimately prevent 
future violations.171
Critics have argued that restricted voluntary funding is problematic 
because it distorts IO program priorities and moves IO programming 
decisions outside the organization itself to individual donors.172 In the 
WHO example, critics contend that restricted voluntary funds are more 
often “aimed at diseases that capture the public’s attention, like HIV
/AIDS,” rather than aligned with the true distribution of diseases 
worldwide.173 But without voluntary funding to organizations such as 
the SRSG-SVC, there is a risk that victims and survivors in conflict-
ridden areas risk may be deprived of sorely needed aid. Even if one ac-
cepts the premise of the argument in the context of the WHO, the cir-
cumstances surrounding wartime sexual violence are very different. Re-
stricted voluntary funding must be considered against the backdrop of 
Security Council Resolutions which have done little to quell wartime 
sexual violence; in this context, arguments about the model manage-
ment of IO funds verge on idealism.174
A final point in support of restricted voluntary funding over Secu-
rity Council Resolutions comes from behaviors that may accompany 
U.N. Member States’ donations. Donations to IOs such as the SRSG-
SVC from powerful actors coupled with naming and shaming to prod 
other donors to do the same has the potential to create a ripple effect of 
positive outcomes. In keeping with the analogy of pollution prevention, 
consider what has been coined as the “Greta Thunberg Effect.”175
Thunberg is a seventeen-year-old Swedish environmental activist.176 Her 
170. See MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-02 (2011).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 160, at 175, 186.
173. Id. at 189.
174. See generally Graham, supra note 160.
175. Bonnie Chiu, The Greta Thunberg Effect: The Rise of Girl Eco-Warriors, FORBES (Sept. 
19, 2019, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniechiu/2019/09/19/the-
greta-thunberg-effect-the-rise-of-girl-eco-warriors/#7bbcf627407f [https://perma.cc
/E6U8-4RK4].
176. As of December 2020, Thunberg is seventeen. Aylin Woodward, Greta Thunberg 
Turns 17 Today. Here’s How She Started a Global Climate Movement in Just 18 
Months, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/greta-thunberg-bio-climate-change-activist-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/M9A3-3BQ3].
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2019 speech at the U.N.’s Climate Action Summit castigating members 
for their inaction on climate change was the pinnacle of her widely 
broadcasted efforts to name and shame world leaders on environmental 
failures.177 Thunberg’s campaign has had tangible effects. Teenagers 
across the world are committing themselves to climate activism at a 
higher rate and earlier age than previously recorded.178 Some consider 
Thunberg to be responsible for the incoming European Commission 
making the climate emergency its topmost priority.179 And perhaps most 
striking, there has been a fourfold increase in investments in carbon-
reducing projects in developing countries since Thunberg rose to popu-
larity.180 Voluntary funding can force these changes as it is a multifacet-
ed method. Motivated U.N. Member States that use voluntary funding 
in conjunction with call-outs for other states to follow their example 
could prove extraordinarily effective in ending conflict-related sexual vi-
olence.
ii. Regular, Credible Monitoring and Threat of Enforcement
The final two factors that will aid in addressing wartime sexual vio-
lence are best analyzed together as they are often interrelated. They are, 
first, regular and credible monitoring, and second, the threat of en-
177. Charlotte Alter, Suyin Haynes & Justin Worland, Time 2019 Person of the Year: Gre-
ta Thunberg, TIME (Dec. 11, 2019), https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2019-greta-
thunberg/ [https://perma.cc/JEK3-8L6X]; Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech at the 
U.N. Climate Action Summit, NPR (Sept. 23, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.npr.org
/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-
action-summit [https://perma.cc/EX98-QDAN].
178. Chiu, supra note 175.
179. Ian Wishart & Ewa Krukowska, Europe’s $13 Trillion Climate Plan Might Be About to 
Get Serious, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2019-10-01/europe-s-13-trillion-climate-plan-might-be-about-to-get-
serious [https://perma.cc/GD9S-3BEM]. Note that there is a rich debate surrounding 
which individuals get international media recognition for their activism. BIPOC in-
dividuals’ efforts are frequently excluded from the dominant narrative and a move-
ment has emerged (spearheaded by young activists such as Vanessa Nakate) to recog-
nize and support diversity in environmental activism. See Kenya Evelyn, ‘Like I 
Wasn’t There’: Climate Activist Vanessa Nakate on Being Erased from a Movement,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan
/29/vanessa-nakate-interview-climate-activism-cropped-photo-davos
[https://perma.cc/GD9S-3BEM].
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[https://perma.cc/G3BF-KQ55].
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forcement. In the Chittock study, the most effective pollution preven-
tion programs were those with successful monitoring practices.181 These 
included enhanced public and private monitoring networks, senior 
management commitment, and transparency through public report-
ing.182 The most successful prevention programs also made use of strong 
enforcement measures.183
U.N. members should make use of monitoring systems already in 
place184 and leverage them for this cause. Consider the example of fe-
male genital mutilation (FGM) of young girls, a practice in thirty coun-
tries around the world.185 The United Nations Population Fund 
(“UNFPA”) along with the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(“UNICEF”) have had great success in accelerating the elimination of 
the practice, providing more than 3.2 million women in seventeen
countries with FGM protection and services.186 They achieved this pro-
gress primarily through the provision of care and protection services, lo-
cal political backing, and community-led engagement efforts that act as 
monitoring systems to deter and prevent FGM in their respective coun-
tries.187
The provision of care and protection services is also important 
within the context of wartime sexual violence. Ensuring that victims of 
wartime sexual violence have access to abortion and other sexual health 
services is a requirement under international law.188 It is also a painfully 
practical necessity, as survivors forced to carry a child conceived during 
wartime sexual violence may be ostracized by their community, subject-
ed to spousal abandonment and violence, and even killed for the per-
ceived dishonoring of their family.189 All these effects are felt on top of 
the mental and physical agony of the violence itself.190 The provision of 
181. Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 545-46.
182. Id. at 545.
183. Id.
184. See discussion supra Section III.B (detailing the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence 
in Conflict initiative).
185. Although FGM is practiced in thirty countries around the world, note that four 
countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan) account for approximately 42% of 
all cases. 6 Facts About Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), WORLD VISION (2019),
https://www.worldvision.org/child-protection-news-stories/female-genital-
mutilation-fgm-facts [https://perma.cc/6NKS-UDDQ].
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sexual health services and abortion for survivors of wartime sexual vio-
lence may allow women to escape the piling on of more lasting psycho-
logical, economic, and physical burdens.191
To be truly effective, any strategy to combat sexual violence as a 
weapon of war must begin before conflict arises.192 For example, studies 
have shown that a link exists between regions that have high levels of 
domestic violence during peacetime and the incidents of sexual violence 
that take place during armed conflict.193 Within the pollution context, 
prevention programs were more successful when there were high levels 
of commitment by local government;194 similarly, to prevent sexual vio-
lence during wartime, there must be high levels of commitment by local 
authorities during times of peace to credibly crack down on instances of 
violence against women.195 Ensuring the development of successful 
monitoring systems during times of peace addresses the causes of the is-
sue instead of merely quashing the symptoms. Arguably, by the time a 
U.N. resolution is deemed necessary to address sexual violence as a 
weapon of war, it is already too late. Monitoring may therefore prove far 
more effective at combatting the use of this violence.
In addition to preventative measures such as those described above, 
the threat of credible enforcement to intervene in and punish wartime 
sexual violence must also exist. This should come through additional 
funding and training for U.N. peacekeepers. U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sions can be remarkably effective. As of July 2020, there are over 
100,000 active peacekeepers taking part in thirteen missions around the 
world.196 It is a truly global effort, in that more than 120 countries con-
tribute personnel to the peacekeeping forces.197 The forces contribute to 
a variety of efforts, from supporting local regional police on the ground 
in efforts to end violence; to deterring extrajudicial violence and kid-
nappings in areas of conflict; to strengthening security, the rule of law, 
191. Id.
192. See Kirthi Jayakumar, Sexual Violence as a Peacetime-Wartime Continuum, PEACE 
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violence-as-a-peacetime-wartime-continuum/ [https://perma.cc/64NU-V276].
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and human rights.198 Peacekeeping is also cost-efficient. The U.N.
peacekeeping budget is less than half of 1% of the amount spent on mil-
itaries globally, yet more than eight times as effective as compared to 
when the United States acts in similar missions by itself.199
Still, two main problems persist with U.N. peacekeeping missions: 
inadequate funding and a harmful culture. Each is difficult to separate 
from the other. Because U.N. peacekeeping missions are far from per-
fect as they currently exist, solutions are needed before they can play an 
effective role in enforcement actions. A mere six years ago, a U.N. decla-
ration named sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers as, “the 
most significant risk to U.N. peacekeeping missions.”200 Some scholars 
suggest that despite operational directives to prevent this abuse—
curfews, non-fraternization policies, uniform requirements, and off-
limit locations—success has been limited and sexual abuse by peace-
keepers has merely been “pushed underground.”201 Commentators opine 
that training for peacekeeping operations currently functions as an ad-
ministrative rubber stamp rather than a meaningful program that instills 
peacekeepers with shared values, knowledge, and practical know-how.202
The training program is bereft of opportunities to think critically, and 
procedural compliance is considered to be of greater value than reckon-
ing with problematic social structures that prop up cultures of sexual vi-
olence.203
This is a staggering failure in the U.N. peacekeeping culture. 
Worse, initiatives to correct failures in peacekeeping operations tend to 
be reactive and largely concerned with the risk to the U.N.’s image, in-
stead of addressing the root of the issue. As Professors Jasmine-Kim 
Westendorf and Louise Searle note:
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Despite powerful statements about the ‘cancer’ of [sexual 
abuse and exploitation during peacekeeping operations] and 
the U.N.’s commitment to addressing it, the advancement of
[sexual abuse and exploitation] policy has been largely reac-
tive, occurring in surges prompted by public outcry at inci-
dents reported in international media . . . Paradoxical though 
it may seem, [the U.N.] seems concerned with both protect-
ing its image and developing robust [sexual abuse and exploi-
tation] framework; but the former creates incentives to 
downplay difficulties in the latter . . . thereby impairing the 
chances of arriving at robust assessments of [sexual abuse and 
exploitation] allegations and policy which might lead to im-
proved approaches.204
This analysis reveals several areas that must be improved for peacekeep-
ing forces to reach their full potential in eliminating wartime sexual vio-
lence and to prevent peacekeeping forces from committing the same 
crimes that they are deployed to prevent.
First, nations must retreat from lofty pronouncements on global 
statements of principle, such as U.N. resolutions, and use voluntary 
funding sources to promote transparency and true change within peace-
keeping operations through proactive rather than reactive measures. 
Second, as in the pollution context, commitment by “senior manage-
ment” and public reporting is key.205 Funds must be devoted to the crea-
tion of a system whereby superiors in charge of peacekeeping operations 
are incentivized to report instances of sexual exploitation by personnel 
within their ranks with the knowledge that material punishments of 
204. Id. at 382. Westendorf and Searle continue:
One key weakness is that policy has been developed at the international 
level in response to major media events with little input from the field 
about challenges already faced in implementing SEA policies . . . This in-
dividualized understanding of SEA masks the diverse range of factors that 
create circumstances in which individuals choose to exploit or abuse, and 
obscures the practical challenges that middle- to high-ranking officials 
pose when they refuse to deal with allegations or are simply too occupied 
with ‘hard security’ issues to take ‘gender issues’ seriously. Further, a 
compliance-based approach assumes that robust accountability mecha-
nisms will deter breaches of rules—a logic for which there is little evi-
dence in relation to CRSV, and which is further undermined by the low 
rates of criminal charges or material punishments for perpetrators of 
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perpetrators will be issued and enforced.206 This will almost certainly re-
quire individualized training to recognize and punish any sexual vio-
lence that occurs.207 At present, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations is woefully underfunded for this task.208
There is no lack of ideas to solve sexual abuse and exploitation by 
peacekeepers; rather, the problem lies in the capacity, expertise, and 
money to implement those ideas.209 States with an interest in funding 
effective programs to prevent sexual violence during times of conflict 
should view peacekeeping as an integral part of the solution.210 Solving 
the liquidity crisis that the U.N. peacekeeping forces currently face and 
earmarking funds for robust training practices for the troops will work 
to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers. Further, this 
will serve to reinforce the threat of credible enforcement against would-
be perpetrators of sexual violence during times of conflict.
Conclusion
U.N. resolutions are frequently used as well-intentioned efforts to 
draw international attention to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of 
war. However, they are not only ineffective, but can be damaging to the 
status of and discourse surrounding women’s rights. Each resolution is a 
gamble: Recent history has shown that disagreements during negotia-
tions and the threat of a veto by a Permanent Five member are likely to 
derail any meaningful form of progress.
More useful and effective U.N. mechanisms exist and should be 
used in place of Security Council Resolutions. Solutions may be found 
by looking to the successes of voluntary pollution prevention programs: 
206. Westendorf & Searle, supra note 201, at 383.
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The problem facing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the 
volume of personnel required to undertake mandatory training: latest sta-
tistics show 117,306 military and civilian personnel from at least 125 
countries serving in 16 [peace keeping operations]. The vast number of 
personnel poses the risk that training becomes more an administrative re-
quirement than a tool for effective prevention.
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Consistent funding by way of voluntary restricted funding; regular, 
credible monitoring; and the credible threat of enforcement by U.N.
peacekeeping operations may turn the tide on the prevention of sexual 
violence during wartime. U.N. members should not eschew collabora-
tion on these commitments, but should also exercise independence in 
pushing toward these goals. This should be the case even if the countries 
in question are not fully supported by the most powerful states within 
the U.N.
Although discourse surrounding the prevention of wartime sexual 
violence has arguably moved past its history of being sidelined as a 
“feminist research agenda,” there is still a lack of accountability and ri-
gor surrounding estimates of sexual violence during conflict.211 This 
means that a large amount of wartime sexual violence still remains un-
reported,212 notwithstanding the extraordinarily grim numbers of which 
we are aware.213 When unanimous agreement is unreachable yet urgently 
needed, as in Security Council Resolutions, states must make use of in-
stitutional mechanisms that currently exist within the U.N. that do not 
require compromise or concessions. This may come through the provi-
sion of voluntary funds to U.N. offices such as the SRSG-SVC and 
WPA, coupled with naming and shaming of other states who refuse to 
do the same; through support for U.N. funds that aim to eliminate vio-
lence against women during times of peace; and through voluntary 
funding for the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Sexual 
violence during times of conflict is sure to emerge time and again in 
new and ongoing conflicts if new strategies are not explored. It is in-
cumbent upon Member States to assume responsibility for these pre-
ventable tragedies. The realistic methods outlined within this Note 
should be the first steps toward a workable and collaborative effort to 
end wartime sexual violence.
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